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Some theorists hold that the human perceptual system has a component that receives
input only from units lower in the perceptual hierarchy. This thesis, that we shall here
refer to as the encapsulation thesis, has been at the center of a continuing debate for the
past few decades. Those who deny the encapsulation thesis often rely on the large body
of psychological findings that allegedly suggest that perception is influenced by factors
such as the beliefs, desires, goals, and the expectations of the perceiver. Proponents
of the encapsulation thesis, however, often argue that, when correctly interpreted, these
psychological findings are compatible with the thesis. In our view, the debate over the
significance and the correct interpretation of these psychological findings has reached
an impasse. We hold that this impasse is due to the methodological limitations over
psychophysical experiments, and it is very unlikely that such experiments, on their own,
could yield results that would settle the debate. After defending this claim, we argue that
integrating data from cognitive neuroscience resolves the debate in favor of those who
deny the encapsulation thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
Participants in the debate over whether cognition can influence perception could be roughly divided
into two camps. One camp consists of those who emphasize that the information that is received
through the senses is not sufficient to uniquely determine the correct hypothesis about its distal
causes. Their proposal is that in order to solve this under-determination problem, the inputs of
perception must be supplemented by more information, such as the background beliefs of the
perceiver. Perceptual processes thus have access to central cognition and are susceptible to influence
by cognition. The opposing camp, which we refer to as the modularists, acknowledges that the
input to the perceptual system needs to be supplemented to solve the under-determination problem.
Nevertheless, they hold that the additional information is localized to the perceptual module.
A central intuition behind the modularist approach is that evaluating the incoming stimulus
in light of a large body of information is time consuming and costly. And since a well-designed
perceptual system should enable fast responses to changing environmental conditions, it must
lack access to the totality of information that a perceiver has. Imagine contemplating the possible
visual tricks that someone might have played on you when it seems that a lion is about to attack
you on a safari. Even if that sort of contemplation is something that you are prone to do, it is
better if your perceptual system does not have this propensity, and one way to guarantee that it
does not is to limit its access to what is directly relevant to its domain of input. This is one of
the main insights behind Fodor’s original distinction between what he calls “input analyzers” and
“central cognition.” Input analyzers are in the business of fast analysis of incoming data on the
basis of a limited body of information, which is typically domain specific, innate, and localized.
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Central cognition, in contrast, is in the business of belief
formation, problem solving, contemplation, etc., on the basis
of information that is often domain general, learned, and non-
localized.
Our focus in this paper will be on the empirical evidence
pertaining to a thesis that is at the core of the modularity
debate. This is the thesis that the human perceptual system has
components that are informationally encapsulated. Relying on
Fodor’s terminology, we call these components modules1. As a
first approximation, the claim that a module is informationally
encapsulated means that the processes within the module have
access only to the contents of other processes within the module
as well as input from earlier units in the perceptual hierarchy2.
Throughout the paper, we refer to the thesis that the perceptual
system has at least one informationally encapsulated module as
the generic encapsulation thesis.
If the encapsulation thesis is correct, then the functioning of
the visual module should be free from content-sensitive influence
both from other modules and cognitive processes “up stream” in
the visual hierarchy. However, there is a large body of research,
starting in themid-twentieth century and extending to the present
date, which purports to establish that perception can be influenced
by cognitive factors such as the stimulus’s meaning, its familiarity,
its predictability, the context it appears in, the concepts the
perceiver uses to categorize it, and more (for some recent findings
and reviews, see Hansen et al., 2006; Levin and Banaji, 2006;
Lupyan and Spivey, 2008; Lupyan et al., 2010; Macpherson, 2012;
Lupyan and Ward, 2013; Stokes, 2013; For earlier findings on the
topic, see Bruner, 1957, 1973; Rock, 1983; Goldstone, 1995; and
the extensive review in Pylyshyn, 1999).
The vast majority of this research comes from psychophysical
studies that track potential cognitive effects on perceptual
performance3. Modularists rarely deny the effects that these
studies purport to show. Rather, their main strategy has been
to argue that the results of these studies can be interpreted in
ways that are compatible with their preferred version of the
encapsulation thesis. In fact, a quick survey of the history of the
debate over the empirical evidence reveals a pattern in which
anti-modularists produce new results which are subsequently
explained away by the modularists4.
We agree with the modularists that the many of the existing
psychophysical findings could be explained away. However,
we disagree with the modularists that this indicates that
the encapsulation thesis is correct. In our view, reflection
on the general methodological limitations of psychophysical
1This is not to say that this property exhausts or is definitional of what a
module is. Fodor (1983), for example, attributes nine properties to modules
one of which is informational encapsulation.
2We hold that any information that a process receives is, by definition, input
to the process. So we think that defining informational encapsulation in terms
of having access only to inputs makes the thesis trivially true and thus non-
substantive.
3An exception to this is Raftopoulos (2009, 2014) who engages with the
evidence coming from neuroscience.
4See Pylyshyn (1999), Durgin et al. (2009, 2012), Raftopoulos (2009),
Zeimbekis (2013), and Firestone and Scholl (2014, 2015a,b) for examples of
modularist replies. For a review of some of the empirical exchange between
modularists and anti-modularists see Witt et al. (2015).
experiments shows that it is very unlikely that such experiments,
on their own, could yield results that could not be explained away
by the modularists. It is therefore not the truth of the thesis, but
the nature of psychophysical methodology, that is the underlying
cause of the impasse. Our first goal in this paper is to defend this
claim. However, we do not think that one should be skeptical of
the possibility of an empirical resolution to this debate. In fact,
we believe that integrating data from cognitive neuroscience will
very likely resolve the debate in favor of the anti-modularists.
Defending this claim is the second goal of this paper.
We have defined the generic encapsulation thesis as the thesis
that there is an informationally encapsulated component of the
perceptual system, namely a module. However, for reasons to
be discussed soon, this paper focuses on a much more specific
variant of the generic encapsulation thesis. This variant, roughly
characterized, holds that there is an informationally encapsulated
component of the perceptual system that gives rise to access
conscious representations.
Here is how we will proceed. In the next section, we
further explicate the generic encapsulation thesis, distinguish
among some of its interesting variants, and elaborate on the
link between these variants and some broader theoretical
issues surrounding the modularity debate. This discussion helps
clarify and justify our choice for focusing on the specific
version of the thesis in the rest of the paper. However, those
readers who are interested in quickly getting to our main
arguments can skip straight to the “Psychological Case Against
Encapsulation” section which focuses on the psychophysical
evidence. In that section, we identify three core demands that
psychophysical studies must meet in order to establish the
failure of encapsulation. We then argue that the nature of these
demands make it very unlikely that purely psychophysical studies
would be sufficient to reject the thesis. Our methodological
conclusion is that the empirical approach to the debate has to
draw on data from sources other than purely psychophysical
studies. This is what we shall do in the “Neural Case Against
Encapsulation” section where we draw on recent findings in
neuroscience and argue that they militate against the version
of the encapsulation thesis that we describe in the next
section.
THE ENCAPSULATION THESIS
Earlier we defined the generic encapsulation thesis as the thesis
that there is an informationally encapsulated component of the
perceptual system, namely a module. Amodule is informationally
encapsulated in the sense that its processes have access only
to the contents of other processes within the module and the
information provided by earlier units in the perceptual hierarchy.
As we use the term, processes are transitions from one set of
contentful states to another. A contentful state is one that can
be assessed for veridicality. Under this definition, a chemical or
an electrical event is not a process. When a content enters into
the proximal explanation for why a process happens as it does,
that process is said to access that content5. Suppose that in order
5Note that this is different from saying that the content enters the explanation
of why the process is the process that it is.
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to explain why John draws the conclusion that Steve is mortal
from the premise that Steve is a human being, you use a syllogism
that relies on the premise that all human beings are mortal. This
is a proximal explanation. Therefore, in our terminology, you
are assuming that John’s transition from the belief state with the
content “Steve is a human being” to the state with the content
“Steve is mortal” is caused by John accessing the content “All
human beings are mortal.” Now, suppose John formed the belief
that all human beings aremortal from reading a book, and he read
the book because he believed that books are useful. The belief
that books are useful has thus entered into an explanation for
why John transitions from the former belief state to the latter, but
this explanation is not a proximal explanation. Similarly, there are
non-proximal explanations of perceptual processes that involve
content that do not imply that those perceptual processes access
that content.
The idea behind the generic encapsulation thesis is therefore
that all the transitions between contentful states in the module
are proximally explained in terms of contents of states within the
module or the input that the module receives from earlier units in
the perceptual hierarchy. We shall say more about the perceptual
hierarchy in the “Neural Case Against Encapsulation” section.
Due to its generality, the generic encapsulation thesis is too
easy to satisfy and seems to be theoretically unattractive. For
example, one might easily find a small neuronal assembly or
a single neuron in the visual system that is informationally
encapsulated. However, it is not clear how the truth of such
a thesis would relate to the broader theoretical issues that are
often linked to the modularity debate. Some of these theoretical
issues include questions about the structure and function of the
perceptual system, whether perception is a bottom-up or a top-
down process, whether observation is theory-neutral, whether
perceptual experience has conceptual content, and whether a
foundationalist epistemology is tenable6. Rather than focusing on
the generic encapsulation thesis, we should therefore focus on its
specific variants.We can obtain such specific variants by imposing
further functional constraints on the module. If these constraints
are properly related to the theoretical issues surrounding the
modularity debate, the resulting variants of the thesis would be
more theoretically interesting.
In his canonical statement of the modularity thesis in The
Modularity of Mind, Fodor argues that the purpose of the
perceptual module is to provide fast analysis of sensory input on
the basis of informationally encapsulated, domain specific, innate,
and localized informational processes. The representations that
result from this analysis are subsequently provided as input to
higher cognitive centers and the action system.
The idea that the outputs of the perceptual modules serve as
input to higher systems imposes a functional constraint on the
notion of the module. Let us call a representation that could be
used by higher cognitive centers and the action system without
further processing a pickup ready representation7. In this case, the
6For some discussion of the theoretical issues concerning the modularity
debate (see Fodor, 1984; Churchland, 1988; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988;
Raftopoulos, 2001; Siegel, 2012; Stokes, 2013).
7It is not completely obvious what could serve this function. But there are some
proposals on the table. For example, on Pylyshyn’s view, modules have to give
functional constraint is that the outputs of the perceptual modules
should be pickup ready representations. Adding this constraint
to the generic encapsulation thesis would give us the following
variant:
Pickup Ready Encapsulation
There is a component of the perceptual system that gives
rise to pickup ready representations and is informationally
encapsulated.
A module’s functional role in providing input to other systems
is not the only theoretical issue that is relevant to the encapsulation
thesis. One reason for the earlier surge of philosophical interest
in modularity has been whether observation is theory-laden,
with some modularists arguing that encapsulation suggests that
observation is theory-neutral (see Fodor, 1984; Raftopoulos,
2001). But obviously, not just any form of the encapsulation thesis
would have this implication. Suppose, for example, that Pickup
Ready Encapsulation is correct and there is a visual module that
gives rise to pickup ready representations. Still, it might be the case
that the outputs of this allegedmodule are pre-observational in the
sense that there is more processing that has to happen over these
outputs before they give rise to what can be properly regarded as
observation. Since there is still the possibility that these additional
processes are not encapsulated, pickup ready encapsulation and
the theory-ladenness theses could both be correct at the same
time.
The same observation applies to the link between the
encapsulation thesis and epistemic issues. Siegel (2012), for
example, has argued that some types of encapsulation failure
threaten a foundationalist approach in perceptual epistemology.
If perception is influenced by background beliefs, then a
potentially problematic circularity threatens the idea that
perception can serve as the foundation for justifying beliefs.
Thus, a foundationalist who accepts Siegel’s arguments might be
interested in saving encapsulation. But again, for similar reasons
to those that show that it does not disprove the theory-ladenness
thesis, Pickup Ready Encapsulation may not serve this purpose.
We therefore need to impose further constraints on Pickup
Ready Encapsulation to establish a better link with the above
theoretical issues. One possible constraint is to restrict
encapsulation to person-level representations. Adding this
constraint would give us the following thesis.
Person-Level Encapsulation
There is a component of the perceptual system that gives
rise to person-level pickup ready perceptual states and is
informationally encapsulated.
The above version of the thesis gets closer to the theoretical
issues surrounding encapsulation. However, those who submit
rise to what he calls “proto-objects” which are themselves the products of two
sets of processes within the early visual system: those that compute features
such as color, depth, luminance, and motion (Pylyshyn, 1999, p. 361–362),
and those that bind these features into a single proto-object by top-down and
horizontal processes within early vision. The binding of the features into a
proto-object creates representations that are stable and robust enough to be
compared with representations in long-term memory for use in recognition
and identification (Pylyshyn, 2001, p. 145).
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to common forms of internalist epistemology would not find
this move very satisfactory. On such views, a state is capable
of epistemic evaluation in so far as it belongs to a domain that
a subject can access through reflection. Those who accept this
form of internalism also have a tendency to demand that a state
counts as an observation in so far as it is available to reflection.
This suggests stronger constraints on the encapsulation thesis;
constraints that would link it to the possibility of reflection. One
such constraint is that the outputs of the encapsulated module
have to be phenomenally conscious. This is because there is
an intuitive connection between phenomenal consciousness and
observation. Onemight even say that it is nomologically necessary
that a subject, S, observes an object (or property) only if the subject
has a phenomenally conscious representation of the object (or
property). In fact, it is not uncommon to characterize the effect of
cognition on perception in terms of its effect on the phenomenal
content of perceptual experience (for example, see Macpherson,
2012). Adding this constraint will give us a new thesis.
Phenomenal Encapsulation
There is a component of the perceptual system that gives
rise to phenomenally conscious representations and is
informationally encapsulated.
However, those who think that there is a gap between
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness might
question the link between phenomenal encapsulation and
observation (see Block, 1995, 2005). The reason could be that in
order for a representation to qualify as an observation, it should
be access conscious in the sense that it has to be readily available
for verbal report, voluntary control of action, and other personal-
level functions8. In this sense, however, a phenomenally conscious
representationmight not be access conscious.We should therefore
distinguish Phenomenal Encapsulation from another version of
the generic thesis.
Access Encapsulation
There is a component of the perceptual system that
gives rise to access conscious representations and is
informationally encapsulated.
So far we have four versions of the encapsulation thesis. These
theses are somewhat independent in that one might be false while
the others are true. Are there any of these theses that should be
regarded as the central encapsulation thesis? We think the answer
is negative. A pluralist view according to which there are different
versions of the encapsulation thesis that respond to different
theoretical demands is, in our view, the correct view. Nevertheless,
our focus in this paper will be onAccess Encapsulation. This is not
because we think perceptual states have to be access conscious.
Our main reason is that in comparison to the other versions of
the thesis, Access Encapsulation bears the most clear relationship
8Note that a representation could be pickup ready without being access
conscious. For example, a representation might be ready to be picked up
by systems that are responsible for involuntary action without being access
conscious. If, as Milner and Goodale (1995) have argued, the representations
in the dorsal stream could control involuntary action without being conscious,
the dorsal stream representations are pickup ready but not access conscious.
to the broader philosophical issues surrounding the modularity
debate. It’s rather intuitive that the failure of Access Encapsulation,
even if turns out that the other versions of the theses are truewould
be philosophically significant. But whether the failure of other
forms of encapsulation in those cases where Access Encapsulation
remains intact has important philosophical implications or not is
less intuitively clear. So our focus in this paper will be on access
encapsulation.
The possible constraints that we have discussed so far concern
the output of the module. Obviously, output is not the only feature
that is relevant for determining the function of a module. One
also needs to determine what serves as input to a module. It
might seem natural to assume that the input to the perceptual
modules should be equated with the physical energy at the
level of sensory receptors. On such a view, modules start where
sensory receptors start. But this is not the only option. Fodor’s
distinction between transducers and input analyzers can help
us see why (Fodor, 1983). On Fodor’s view, transducers are in
the business of transforming one form of physical energy—for
instance, luminance and hue—to another—for example, action
potentials in the neuronal axons. According to Fodor, transducers
do not perform any computation, and since perceptual modules
start where computation starts, modules do not start at the
boundaries of sensory organs. The same could be said about
any units that transfer and relay the signal from transducers
without performing any computations over them. So on a broadly
Fodorian view, modules would be higher up in the perceptual
hierarchy after units that transduce, transfer, and relay the signal
without performing computations.
Fodor’s distinction between the components of the perceptual
system that perform computation and those that do not is
controversial. Even if we accept it, it is not completely clear why
the lower boundaries of the module have to coincide with the
boundaries of computation. But the point of mentioning Fodor’s
distinction here is not to defend or reject it. The point is that there
are at least two possible ways to draw the lower boundaries of a
module. One option is to hold that the visual module starts where
the boundaries of the sensory organs start. The other option is to
hold that the visual module starts further upstream in the visual
system. One principled way to determine where it starts would
be to point to where computation starts. We thus get two new
versions of the encapsulation thesis.
Primary Encapsulation
There is a component of the perceptual system whose
lower boundaries coincide with the sensory receptors and
is informationally encapsulated.
Middle Encapsulation
There is a component of the perceptual system whose
lower boundaries are further upstream from transducers,
transformers and relay centers, and is informationally
encapsulated.
Obviously, the significance and the strength of the
encapsulation thesis also depends on whether it is a primary
form of encapsulation or a middle form. In this paper we will
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FIGURE 1 | Primary (A) and middle encapsulation (B) are represented. We use Fodor’s distinction between central cognition and the various components of
the perceptual system. Green arrows in each figure represent flow of information that is compatible with the corresponding version of encapsulation. Red arrows
represent flow of information that would be incompatible with encapsulation.
consider the empirical status of both theses (see Figure 1 for
an illustration). Unless explicitly noted otherwise, when we
refer to the encapsulation thesis we will mean the disjunction of
Primary Access Encapsulation and Middle Access Encapsulation.
However, middle encapsulation is the dominant thesis among
modularists and we will pay more attention to it. Furthermore
our discussion will mainly focus on vision. Accordingly, we
will be focusing on whether there is an encapsulated visual
module.
One last point before we move on deserves emphasis. The
encapsulation thesis is stronger than the oft-discussed thesis that
perceptual modules are cognitively impenetrable (see Pylyshyn,
1999; Payne, 2001; Raftopoulos, 2001, 2014; Macpherson, 2012;
Stokes, 2013). The main difference here is that informational
encapsulation does not only concern cognitive contents. If the
cognitive impenetrability thesis is true, then no cognitive state
from outside the module can be accessed by processes inside the
module. On the other hand, if the encapsulation thesis is true, then
no contentful state outside themodule, whether it can be regarded
as cognitive or not, can be accessed by the processes within the
module.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE AGAINST
ENCAPSULATION
Our goal in the following sections is to show that purely
psychophysical studies cannot provide sufficient evidence against
encapsulation. We do so by identifying three challenges that
psychophysical studies must meet. They are the post-perceptual
challenge, the intra-modular challenge and the pre-modular
challenge. We then argue that no psychophysical study could
jointly meet all three of them.
The Post-Perceptual Challenge
Consider an experiment in which subjects are shown images
in which an individual is holding an object that is difficult to
identify. Suppose that the results show that whether the subjects
would report seeing a gun or a tool depends on the race of the
individual holding the object (Payne, 2001). One interpretation of
these findings is that implicit racial biases affect the percept, or, in
other words, the way the object is seen9. Another interpretation
is that implicit racial biases do not influence the way the object
is seen, but only influence the subject’s post-perceptual judgment
about the identity of the object. The difference between these
interpretations is relevant to the encapsulation thesis. The first
interpretation is potentially incompatible with the encapsulation
thesis because it shows that the processes that give rise to a percept
can be influenced by factors outside the alleged visual module.
However, on the second interpretation, the effect that implicit
racial biases have on the subject’s performance is mediated by
its effect on post-perceptual judgment. Thus, this interpretation
9By a percept we mean an access conscious representation in the sense
identified in the “Encapsulation Thesis” section.
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is compatible with the encapsulation thesis. Therefore, in order
to show that this finding is potentially troublesome for the
encapsulation thesis we need to be able to rule out the post-
perceptual interpretation.
The point of this example could be easily generalized. In the
above case, the percepts and the behavioral response are mediated
by judgment. However, the processes that influence the link
between percepts and behavioral responses are not confined to
judgment. In principle, it is possible for other mechanisms such
as attention, inference, recognition, memory, various forms of
response bias, etc., to intervene between the output of a module
and a behavioral response. Effects that result from cognitive
influences on the processes that link percepts to behavioral
response should not count as evidence against the encapsulation
thesis. A successful experiment has to be able to determine that
the effect does not occur at a post-perceptual level. We therefore
call this the post-perceptual challenge.
Meeting the post-perceptual challenge is not easy.
Psychophysical studies of effects on perception have to rely
on studies of perceptually-guided behavior. But effects on
perceptually-guided behavior can happen in two ways: either by
affecting the processes that lead to the formation of a percept
or by affecting the processes that translate the percept into a
behavioral response. Obviously, effects that result from cognitive
impact on the latter stage should not count as evidence against
encapsulation. There is, therefore, always a possible post-
perceptual explanation that needs to be ruled out. Psychophysical
experiments must meet this challenge if they are to provide
evidence against the encapsulation thesis.
Some theorists have argued that one strategy to meet the post-
perceptual challenge is to diminish the number of tasks that are
needed to link a percept to a behavioral response. Stokes (2013),
for example, argues that in some studies where the stimulus is
present during the response phase, it would be implausible to
hold that the pattern of response emerges from post-perceptual
factors. For example, in Levin and Banaji (2006), subjects are
asked to match the degree of luminance of a grayscale patch
to the degree of luminance of pictures of faces. These studies
show that the presence of labels (or typical race-indicating facial
features) influence matching behavior. Faces that are labeled
BLACK (or exemplify typical black facial features) are matched
to darker patches than faces that are identical in luminance
but are labeled WHITE (or show typical white facial features).
Stokes argues that it would be implausible to explain away these
results as emerging from post-perceptual judgment. The main
reasons is that such explanations would have the implication that
although subjects have distinct phenomenal experiences of the
luminance of the gray scale patch and the picture they match
to it, they classify them as having the same luminance. This,
in Stoke’s view, renders these interpretations comparatively less
plausible.
It is correct that post-perceptual explanations in the above
match-to-sample experiments have a lower degree of plausibility
in comparison to experiments that rely on memory, but this is
clearly insufficient to show that they are implausible explanations
per se. We should note that there could be phenomenally
non-identical experiences that are nonetheless phenomenally
indistinguishable. In other words, a subject might have different
experiences that she cannot distinguish from each other10. If this
is plausible, then it is plausible that for any particular experience
that a subject has, there is a range of phenomenally non-identical
but indistinguishable experiences that the subject could match to
this experience in an experimental setting. In other words, as long
as two experiences are phenomenally indistinguishable, it is not
implausible that a subject would classify them as identical, even
when the experiences are non-identical. Perhaps Stokes thinks
that post perceptual explanations, in these cases, are implausible
because they imply that two phenomenally distinguishable
experiences are judged to be identical. However, there is nothing
in the aforementioned studies that demonstrates this. Therefore
a post-perceptual explanation in these cases is not clearly
implausible11,12.
A second possible strategy to rule out post-perceptual
explanations is to draw on the resources of signal detection theory
(SDT). In fact after the advent of SDT, some psychologists quickly
started to use this theory to distinguish perceptual effects from
post-perceptual ones13. However, we believe that the perceptual
vs. post-perceptual distinction that is based on SDT criteria
is orthogonal to the perceptual vs. post-perceptual distinction
that is operative in the debate between the modularists and the
anti-modularists. Let us elaborate on this by first explaining why
some have thought that SDT can help us distinguish between
perceptual and post-perceptual processes.
Those who apply SDT to perception assume that our response
mechanisms have the appropriate built-in structure to distinguish
signal from noise. It is further assumed that this feature of
response mechanisms can be used to distinguish effects on the
response stage from effects on prior stages.
Imagine a task in which subjects are tasked with discriminating
between pictures of dogs and non-dogs by pressing a button.
Suppose subjects are more prone to classify images as dogs
if they hear a story involving dogs before seeing the pictures.
How can we figure out whether this is the result of effects
on a perceptual detection stage during which a perceptual unit
detects the presence of dogs or a post-perceptual response
10Disjunctivists are well-known for distinguishing between phenomenal
distinctness and indistinguishability. But one does not have to be a disjunctivist
in order to distinguish between phenomenal identity and phenomenal
indistinguishability. One might independently be wedded to the view
that phenomenal character is a matter of what belongs to phenomenal
consciousness but indistinguishability is a matter of what a subject can
distinguish under reflection on phenomenally consciousness contents. So the
concepts of phenomenal identity and phenomenal indistinguishability seem
to be distinct concepts. The distinction is also motivated by empirical cases
such as change blindness that seem paradoxical under a view that would
equate phenomenal identity with phenomenal indistinguishability. For, these
cases seem to imply that phenomenal indistinguishability is not a transitive
relation. Identity, however is a transitive relation. So phenomenal identity and
phenomenal indistinguishability cannot be co-extensive.
11Zeimbekis (2013) employs the same strategy in support of a post-perceptual
interpretation of the results of color-matching experiments.
12Firestone and Scholl (2015a) challenge the Levin and Banaji (2006)
experiments by showing that the effects disappear when we blur out race.
They therefore conclude that the effects are pre-perceptual. Our goal here has
been to show that the post-perceptual explanation would still available even if
Firestone and Scholl’s critique of these findings fails.
13For a review of some of these studies see Pylyshyn (1999).
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stage during which a response unit responds to the detection
stage?
From the standpoint of SDT, informational connections are
always noisy. Because of this noise, sometimes the detection unit
is not “telling” the response unit that what it sees is a dog, but it
might “sound” to the response unit that the signal is “dog.” The
basic way that the response unit solves this problem is to adjust a
response threshold (or a response bias). When the input exceeds
the threshold the response unit will treat it as a signal, and if
it is below the threshold it will be treated as noise. The central
assumption behind the SDT approach is that when the input to
a response unit remains constant, adjusting response thresholds is
the only way to affect the behavior of this unit. So, if cognition is
making you more prone to classify a picture as a dog by affecting
the post-perceptual response stage, itmust be doing so by lowering
the response threshold to dogs.
This assumption takes us a long way. Whether an effect is a
threshold effect in this sense or not can be empirically determined.
This is due to an interesting feature of threshold effects. Increasing
the threshold reduces the number of cases where noise is falsely
treated as signal (fewer non-dogs classified as dogs). However, this
has the cost of increasing the number of false negatives, namely,
cases where a signal is falsely treated as noise (more dogs classified
as non-dogs). Decreasing the threshold, in contrast, decreases
false negatives (signal treated as noise) with the cost of an increase
in false positives (noise treated as signal). Changes in threshold
are therefore essentially accompanied by a coupling between
false negatives and false positives. Non-threshold mechanisms,
in contrast, need not give rise to a coupling pattern. So one
way to find out whether an increase in correct responses to a
stimulus type is the result of the adjustment of a threshold is to
figure out whether there is a coupling between false negatives
and false positives. And in principle, one can detect whether
there is such coupling if one has a large data set of responses
that can be statistically analyzed14. The upshot is that threshold
effects can be empirically distinguished from non-threshold
effects.
How can this help us distinguish perceptual effects from post-
perceptual effects? If post-perceptual effects are threshold effects
we can distinguish them from non-threshold effects. But, as was
quickly noted, some perceptual effects are also threshold effects.
So, finding out that an effect is a threshold effect will not tell
us that it is post-perceptual. However, those who think that
SDT can help us solve the problem assume that post-perceptual
effects are essentially threshold effects. So finding out that an
effect is not a non-threshold effect is evidence that it is not post-
perceptual15.
We can now see the conceptual problem with applying SDT to
the task of distinguishing perceptual from post-perceptual effects.
The assumption behind this approach is that post-perceptual
effects are essentially threshold effects. But it is not clear why we
14The two crucial parameters in SDT that were assumed to lend themselves
to this task are d0 (or the sensitivity parameter) and b (or the response bias
parameter). The former is the distance between the means of noise and signal-
plus-noise distributions. Changes in d0 have been taken to indicate changes in
the percept and changes in b as indicators of response bias.
15This is why changes in d0 are regarded as indicative of changes in the percept.
should accept this assumption. There is no conceptual connection
between being post-perceptual and being a threshold effect. Of
course, some examples of post-perceptual effects, e.g., effects of
bias, are plausibly threshold effects. But there is no reason to
assume that what is true of these cases generalizes to all post-
perceptual cases. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that what
is true of the perceptual systemdoes not generalize to the response
system. Everyone agrees that the perceptual system can get better
at figuring out what happens around us in a way that reduces false
positives (or false negatives) without increasing false negatives (or
false positives), but that need not involve threshold mechanisms.
If this is true, then why should we assume that there could not be
non-threshold improvements in how the response system figures
out what the perceptual system is “telling” it? After all, there is
uniformity at the neural level in that the same basic mechanisms
in both the perceptual system and the response system govern the
propagation of neural activity. Why should things be different at
the psychological level of description?
We thus conclude that it is far more difficult to rule out
post-perceptual explanations with psychological methods than
opponents of encapsulation usually think. It would be wrong to
think that post-perceptual explanations of “online” experiments
are implausible. And there is no reason to assume that the
distinction between perceptual and post-perceptual mechanisms
maps to the distinction between threshold and non-threshold
mechanisms. In so far as d0 and other parameters are measures
of the latter distinction, there is no reason to assume that they can
be used to meet the post-perceptual challenge.
This is not to say that post-perceptual explanations could never
be ruled out. We think that in non-borderline conditions and in
the absence of confounding factors it should be uncontroversial
that subjective reports about the perception of a stimulus or its
detectability are good indicators of the existence of percepts. After
all, it is mainly on the basis of subjective reports that everyone
agrees that there is a switch between percepts during binocular
rivalry. However, as we shall argue soon, there is an interesting
interplay between the different challenges that makes it the case
that results that are hard to explain post-perceptually are more
susceptible to the pre-perceptual or intra-modular challenges16.
The Intra-Modular Challenge
As we saw in the previous section, one requirement a study
must meet in order to provide evidence against encapsulation is
to show that the locus of an effect is not post-perceptual. But
this is not sufficient to refute the encapsulation thesis because
it is possible that the origin of the effect is intra-modular. If
both the locus and the origin of an effect are within the visual
module, then the effect cannot count against encapsulation. In
fact, putting both the locus and the origin of an effect inside the
module is a common mode of explanation of what are called
contextual effects. Contextual effects occur when the perception
of individual elements within a visual scene are influenced by
16Wilbertz et al. (2014) and Marx and Einhauser (2015) are example of
studies that demonstrate effects that cannot be easily ruled out as post-
perceptual. Nevertheless, we think these studies do not sufficiently meet the
pre-perceptual challenge. Thanks for an anonymous reviewer for bringing
these studies to our attention.
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FIGURE 2 | The perception of these figures, known as Kanizsa
triangles (or squares) can be explained by interactions within the
visual module.
other elements within the scene. A famous example of this
is the phenomenon of amodal completion where we perceive
elements in the visual scene for which no direct information in
the proximal stimulus is present (see Figure 2 for an illustration
of this phenomena).
The common explanation for contextual effects is that although
stimuli in different areas of the visual field are processed by
different and partially independent units in the visual module,
these units can sometimes interact with each other through intra-
modular connections. These connections embody knowledge. But
this knowledge is embedded within the module, and the fact that
it can influence the output of the module is compatible with the
encapsulation thesis.
This observation generalizes beyond contextual effects. Some
alleged effects on perception can be explained as intra-modular
effects. Therefore, a second challenge for an empirical study that
aims to provide evidence against the encapsulation thesis is to rule
out intra-modular interpretations of the findings. We call this the
intra-modular challenge.
Whether a study can meet this challenge partly depends on
how we draw the boundaries of the visual module. Consider the
experiment at the beginning of the previous section where the
way that subjects categorized an ambiguous image was influenced
by the race of the individual holding the object. It might seem
natural to assume that categorizing an object as a gun or a tool,
or categorizing individuals as belonging to different races, is a
post-modular matter. But it has not been definitively established
that the visual module cannot represent object categories or race
categories. Consider Figure 3 in which we can perceive the shape
in the middle either as number 13 or as letter B. In our view, it is
not implausible at all that the difference between perceiving the
FIGURE 3 | In this figure, the object in the middle can be perceived
either as the number 13 or the letter B. It’s possible to explain this effect
via interactions within the visual module.
letter as a B or as number 13 is a perceptual matter. If so, then
the visual system might be able to represent categories including
object categories and racial categories17. And if this is the case,
effects of racial categories on how objects are categorized can be
potentially explained away as intra-modular effects.
The intra-modular challenge becomes more serious if we
allow, as modularists like Pylyshyn do, that the boundaries of
modules are flexible and can change as a result of perceptual
learning. For example, on a view like this acquiring expertise
in reading written text partly consists in the automatization and
encapsulation of the processes that give rise to representations
of the semantic properties of a word. These processes thus
become part of the visual module. So acquiring fluency
in reading written text partly consists in the fact that the
visual module now comes to represent semantic categories
and the association between these categories and orthographic
markers18. As such, an alleged effect of word meaning on
visual experience of words can result from an intra-modular
effect.
There is no reason to think that such an account could not be
generalized beyond semantic categories. In principle, as a result
of learning, many complex properties and their association with
simpler visual markers such as colors and shapes can come to
be represented by the visual module. If so, the effects of the
representation of these properties on vision can potentially be
explained away as intra-modular.
To see the significance of treating perceptual learning as a form
“modularization,” consider the alleged effect of race indicative
facial features on color perception (Levin and Banaji, 2006).
17For defenses of the view that perceptual experience can have a very rich
representational content see Siegel (2010) and Masrour (2011).
18Of course, in such a case the label “visual module” may not be the best label
anymore.
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Participants in the debate normally assume that representation of
race is a post-perceptual matter. If so, the origin of such effects
would be outside perception, and as a result, the discussion of
these effects has mostly focused on whether they can be ruled
out post-perceptually. But if we allow that the boundaries of the
visual module could expand with learning, the intra-modular
explanation would also become an option. Perceptual learning
might result in the modularization of both the representations
of facial features and their association with a specific color. This
would also explain why such effects are resistant to explicit beliefs
to the contrary and are usually classified as effects of implicit
beliefs. One could therefore explain away the effect of facial
categorization on color perception as an intra-modular effect.
The idea that perceptual learning can result in the
representation of new complex properties might seem
incompatible with modularism. It seems plausible to assume that
new complex properties come to be represented by the visual
module in so far as at some point during the learning process
there have been influences from outside the visual module which
directed the learning process. However, one can distinguish
between two types of learning, namely, Additive Learning
and Revisionary Learning. Revisionary learning changes the
parameters of existing processing capacities within the module.
Revisionary learning, when it happens as a result of access
to information outside the module is incompatible with our
definition of encapsulation. Additive Learning, in contrast,
occurs as a result of the addition of new processing capacities to
the visual module, e.g., new capacities which often allow for the
representation of new properties. This type of learning does not
conflict with the encapsulation thesis as we define it19.
These observations should show that meeting the intra-
modular challenge is not as easy as it initially might seem. Now
let us consider a third challenge for anti-modularists.
The Pre-Modular Challenge
We have so far argued that anti-encapsulationist studies have
to face the challenge of ruling out post-perceptual and intra-
modular explanations of their findings. However, ruling out these
explanations is not sufficient for refuting the encapsulation thesis.
Suppose, for example, that it has been empirically demonstrated
that expert bird-watchers are faster and more accurate in visually
recognizing birds than non-experts. Let us also suppose that we
have successfully ruled out post-perceptual and intra-modular
explanations for this finding. Still, there is the possibility that the
main cause of this difference in performance lies in the fact that
experts employ more efficient visual search strategies. In short,
experts know where to look. As a result, when an expert and
a non-expert look at the same bird, the input that the visual
module of the expert typically receives is different from the
input that the visual module of the non-expert receives. It is
therefore possible to explain the effect of expertise in terms of pre-
perceptual differences in input. This illustrates the pre-modular
challenge.
The pre-modular challenge is not confined to effects of
expertise, and can in principle be employed to explain away
19Thanks to an anonymous reviewer whose comment helped us clarify this
point.
many allegedly cognitive effects on perception. For example, some
priming effects on perception can be explained as pre-modular
effects. Thus a third challenge for an anti-encapsulationist
empirical study is to rule out pre-modular interpretations of the
findings. We call this the pre-modular challenge.
Note that the breadth of the pre-modular challenge partly
depends on whether we accept the primary or the middle version
of the encapsulation thesis. As we noted in the “Encapsulation
Thesis” section, according to Middle Encapsulation the visual
module starts somewhere in the middle of the visual hierarchy.
Specifically, it does not start where the retina starts. On such
a view, some attentional shifts could change the inputs that a
module receives by modulating the activity of the transport or
relay units prior to the visual module (see O’Connor et al., 2002;
Cudeiro and Sillito, 2006; McAlonan et al., 2006). Such effects
would be thus compatible with middle encapsulation.
To meet the pre-modular challenge posed by Middle
Encapsulation, one needs to rule out that the observed effects
are effects of pre-modular attention. Primary Encapsulation, in
contrast, is incompatible with attentional effects on relay centers.
In order to meet the pre-modular challenge posed by Primary
Encapsulation, one only needs to rule out that the observed
effects result from visual search strategies (for example, changes
in direction of gaze and saccadic movements). The pre-modular
challenge is therefore harder to meet if our aim is provide
evidence that Middle Encapsulation fails, as opposed to the
Primary Encapsulation. This is so because, in addition to visual
search strategies, attention may affect the relay and transport
centers between the retina and the lower boundaries of the visual
module.
The effects that result from where a subject looks could
in principle be ruled out by controlling for factors such as
eye movements (whether saccadic or deliberate), but there are
other types of attention that one must rule out. Although the
most frequently cited such attentional effect result from spatial
attention, it is not uncommon for modularists to also appeal to
feature-attention. Pre-modular feature attention occurs when a
subject’s attention to a specific feature changes the activity of units
that relay activity pertaining to that feature.
How could we rule out attentional effects, of any type, by purely
psychophysical experiments? One thought here might be that
attentional effects are weak and are confined to spatial properties
and simple features. So one way to meet the attentional challenge
is to find robust and complex effects on perception.
However, it is not clear that the effects of attention are always
weak and simple. It might be true that pre-modular attentional
shifts can only cause minor changes in the input that a module
receives. However, minor changes in input can result in Gestalt-
like switches in the way that the input is processed. Consider, for
example, Figure 3 again, in which the ambiguous figure can be
interpreted both as number 13 or as the letter B. As we noted,
it is possible to interpret this effect as post-perceptual or intra-
modular. But a third option is that the difference between the
two cases emerges from differences in pre-modular attention. For
example, perception of the shape as a 13 could result from paying
more attention to the gap between the curved and the horizontal
lines, and perceiving it as a B could result from moving attention
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away from the gap. Our visual module is therefore receiving two
different patterns of input in the two cases. And although this
difference might be minor, it may be sufficient to cause a Gestalt
shift in the way that the input is processed by the visual module.
Accordingly, a minor attentional change might result in a robust
difference in whether the perceptual system classifies the input as
a B or a 1320.
It is indeed hard to see how one might be able to meet the pre-
modular challenge by purely psychophysical methods. One might
for example try to design experiments in which the attentional
difference between experimental and control groups or within
subjects during different experiment conditions are minimized.
However, we are aware of no such studies. We therefore think
thatmeeting the pre-modular challenge is especially difficult if our
goal is to refute the middle encapsulation thesis.
The Interplay Between the Challenges
As we noted earlier, there is also an interesting interplay between
the above three challenges in that attempting to meet one of
them often makes meeting the others more difficult. One might,
for example, argue that the early occurrence of an effect is a
reason to rule out that it is a post-perceptual effect. However, this
would obviously make ruling out intra-modular or pre-modular
explanations more difficult.
Another example involves appealing to cognitive
manipulability in order to rule out post-perceptual explanations.
Consider the implicit bias studies that show that subjects who
are otherwise completely unaware of having racial biases are
more prone to report a blurry image as a gun when it’s held
by an African American individual (Payne, 2001). Discussion
of this effect has often focused on explaining it away as a post-
perceptual21. But now suppose that in an attempt to rule out
the post-perceptual explanation, we show that the effect cannot
be manipulated by, say, informing the subjects of their bias.
In other words, the effect turns out to be resistant to cognitive
manipulation. This would give us some reason to think that the
effect is not post-perceptual. The problem is that this would
also increase the likelihood that the effect is intra-modular. In
general, ruling out the post-perceptual explanation of an effect
by showing that it is resistant to cognitive manipulation increases
the likelihood that the effect is intra-modular. So, here too our
attempt to meet the post-perceptual challenge makes it less likely
that we can meet the intra-modular challenge.
We have considered three challenges that psychophysical
studies must meet in order to provide evidence against the
encapsulation thesis. We have argued that meeting these
challenges individually, and in conjunction with each other,
is much more difficult than what has been often assumed. We
conclude that it is unlikely that one would be able to rule out the
encapsulation thesis with purely psychophysical studies.
In a forthcoming BBS target article on this issue, Firestone
and Scholl take a more radical line, arguing that almost all
20For evidence that deployment of spatial attention could influence subsequent
perceptual categorizations see Kietzmann et al. (2011). Thanks to an
anonymous reviewer for bringing this study to our attention.
21Raftopoulos (2009) is an example of this strategy.
psychophysical findings in support of top-down influence has
been debunked. Since most psychological models of perceptual
processing are purely bottom up, they conclude that empirical
evidence favors the encapsulation thesis.
We do not think that the claim that all psychological evidence
against encapsulation has been debunked is correct. In our view,
the evidence is inconclusive. But one who accepts this might still
think that rather than concluding that psychophysics cannot settle
the debate, the correct conclusion should be similar to Firestone
and Scholl’s line that is, we should embrace the encapsulation
thesis.
This line of thought assumes that the encapsulation thesis is
the default and has to be upheld unless there is psychophysical
evidence against it. But we do not see any empirical reasons to
accept the encapsulation thesis as default. It is true that many
workingmodels of psychological processes are bottomup. But that
is mainly because many modelers assume the bottom-up model
as an a priori meta-constraint on psychological theorizing. We
think that given the newly emerging predictive coding models
of perceptual phenomena, this pattern will gradually change (see
Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013, for references).
Somemight also think that the upshot of this conclusion should
be skepticism about the empirical resolution of the debate between
modularists and anti-modularists. However, we think that the
proper reaction is to combine psychophysical studies with other
empirical sources of evidence. In the next section we focus on one
of these sources, namely, the evidence from neuroscience. As we
shall argue, considering this sort of evidence, tilts the balance of
the empirical evidence in favor of the anti-modularist.
THE NEURAL CASE AGAINST
ENCAPSULATION
As we saw in the previous sections, the psychological evidence
against the encapsulation thesis is at best inconclusive. In
the following sections, we examine the plausibility of the
encapsulation thesis from the perspective of neuroscience. This
goes against the common approach in the recent literature that
does not engage with this body of evidence. Our focus will be on
the access version of the encapsulation thesis. As a reminder, this is
the thesis that there is a component of the visual system that gives
rise to access conscious representations and is informationally
encapsulated. As before, we will simply refer to this thesis as
the encapsulation thesis. We argue that recent findings about the
connectivity structure and activity dynamics of the visual system
militate against this thesis.
Our guiding question is whether a neural correlate of an
encapsulated module could be identified in the human visual
system. We consider two strategies for demarcating this alleged
neural correlate. After a quick introduction to the structure
of the visual system, we consider identifying the perceptual
module with a neuroanatomically demarcated area of the visual
system22. We argue that although an area of the cortex that
would correspond to the functional profile of a module could
22Some of the main proponents of the encapsulation thesis associate
perceptual modules with a neuroanatomically demarcatable area of the brain.
This is explicit in Fodor (1984) and Pylyshyn (1999) also seems to tacitly
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FIGURE 4 | This figure shows the Dorsal Stream (red) and Ventral
Stream (blue) in the visual hierarchy.
be roughly demarcated, empirical results show that this area
is not functionally encapsulated. We then consider a strategy
that identifies the neural correlate of the visual module with
a temporally identified process that happens in a roughly
demarcated neuroanatomical region of the cortex. We argue
that although an encapsulated visual process could be identified,
empirical results suggest that this process fails to give rise to access
conscious representations. Lastly, we anticipate a few replies to our
argument and respond to them.
The Neuroanatomical Strategy
Neuroscientific orthodoxy regards the visual system as a
hierarchical structure. Activity starts at the retinal receptors
and passes through the retinal ganglion cells to the lateral
geniculate nucleus (LGN) in the thalamus. This is an area
within the brain stem that is often regarded as a relay center
for sending information to cortical areas. In the case of vision,
projections from LGN connect it to the primary visual cortex
(V1), after which the visual pathway divides into ventral and
dorsal streams. The ventral stream includes areas V2, V4 and the
temporal lobe. The dorsal stream includes areas V3, MT and the
parietal cortex23. The visual system thus manifests a fork-shaped
hierarchical structure (Figure 4).
endorse it. Nevertheless, these theorists have not explicitly proposed any
specific neuroanatomical demarcation of the boundaries of the module.
23This, of course, under describes the complexity of the neural structures that
underlie vision. For example, area MT receives connections from the retinal
ganglion cells through the pulvinar structure in the thalamus and the superior
colliculus (the tectum). These connections entirely bypass the LGN and the
V1–V4 areas. So the place of area MT in the hierarchy is not completely clear.
More importantly, the visual pathways also host an abundance of feedback
connections that relay activity from higher areas of cortex to areas even as low
as the retinal ganglion cells. So the idea that there is a simple neuroanatomical
hierarchy in the visual system is somewhat questionable. Nevertheless, these
complications can be accommodated within a general hierarchical framework
that allows for multiple hierarchical schemes.
This neuroanatomical hierarchy also corresponds to
physiologically and functionally specified hierarchies.
Physiological studies show that neurons in the visual cortex could
be ordered with respect to the size of their receptive fields, that is,
the area of the retina that a neuron responds to. Interestingly, the
ordering on the basis of receptive field sizes roughly corresponds
to the position of a neuron in the neuroanatomical hierarchy;
the higher the neuron in the hierarchy, the larger its receptive
field. According to orthodoxy, the neuroanatomical hierarchy
also roughly corresponds to a functional hierarchy. Different
neurons respond to the presence of different types of stimuli in
their receptive fields. For example, some neurons respond to the
presence of edges, some respond to motion, some respond to
colors, and some respond to complex shapes. This is often called
the tuning function of a neuron. It is commonly held that tuning
functions can also be ordered with respect to their complexity.
For example, detecting a shape is more complex than detecting
an edge. This hierarchy of functional complexity also roughly
corresponds to the neuroanatomical hierarchy: neurons higher
on the neuroanatomical hierarchy have more complex tuning
functions.
If the boundaries of the visual module are neuroanatomical
they should naturally fall somewhere within the visual hierarchy.
The question is where. We shall start with the minimal working
hypothesis that the visual module starts in area V1 and extends to
V4 in the ventral stream. We shall call this area the lower visual
system (LVS).
A few points about identifying the alleged visual module with
LVS are in order. First, LVS does not include areas earlier than
V1 in the visual hierarchy such as retinal receptors, ganglion
cells, and LGN. The encapsulation of LVS would, therefore,
correspond to theMiddle Encapsulation thesis as characterized in
the “Encapsulation Thesis” section. Second, we have not included
the dorsal stream in LVS. The initial rationale for this is that our
focus here is on Access Encapsulation and it is common to assume
that the dorsal stream does not give rise to access conscious
representations24. Third, we have not included areas higher than
V4 in LVS. The main rationale for these limitations is to simplify
the structure of the discussion. After considering whether LVS is
encapsulated, and arguing that it is not, we consider modifying
the minimal working hypothesis by adding areas earlier than V1,
the dorsal stream and areas higher than V4. The basic question to
consider at this stage is whether LVS is encapsulated. We think it
is not. What follows is a review of some of the main findings that
support this claim.
Recent research shows that the receptive field sizes of neurons,
even in the V1 area, change over time (Gilbert and Wiesel, 1989;
Hupe et al., 2001; Li and Gilbert, 2002; Stettler et al., 2002; Bair
et al., 2003; Angelucci and Bressloff, 2006; Gilbert and Li, 2012;
for a review, see Gilbert and Li, 2013). Whereas a neuron’s early
response to stimuli (<100 ms) reflects the presence of a stimulus
in its classical receptive field, a neuron’s later activity (after 100ms)
is sensitive to the presence of flanking stimuli outside its receptive
field. These effects are often referred to as contextual effects. The
24The distinction between the two visual streams is, of course, controversial
(see Schenk and McIntosh, 2009, for a review).
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existence of contextual effects is relevant to encapsulation because
V1neurons do not receive direct input from the areas of retina that
fall outside their classical receptive field. Therefore, if a neuron is
sensitive to the presence of stimuli outside its classical receptive
field, it must receive input from areas other than areas earlier in
the visual hierarchy. And if these areas are outside LVS, then LVS
is not encapsulated. However, modularists often hold that these
contextual effects can be explained in terms of communication
between neurons at the same level of neuroanatomical hierarchy
(horizontal connections) or recurrent feedback from neurons
higher in the visual hierarchy but still within the boundaries of the
visual module. So it might be possible to explain away contextual
effects in terms of connections within LVS.
However, the exact circuitry underlying contextual effects is
still a matter of controversy. There are at least two camps. The first
camp holds that horizontal connections are the primary carriers
of contextual effects. The second camp holds that the primary
carriers of contextual effects are recurrent feedback connections
from areas higher than V1, including MT, which is outside
LVS25. So, whether contextual effects present a threat to the
encapsulation of LVS is still a live issue26.
A second set of findings that poses a more serious threat for
the encapsulation of LVS comes from studies of the circuitry
underlying attentional effects on the visual system. These effects
are often classified into spatial, feature-based, and object-oriented
attentional effects. There are interesting conceptual questions
surrounding these distinctions, but for our purpose what matters
is the following:
(a) It has been shown that spatial attentionmodulates neuronal
responses in V1, V2, and V4 (Mountcastle et al., 1987;
Motter, 1993; Gandhi et al., 1999; Ito and Gilbert, 1999;
McAdams and Maunsell, 1999; Reynolds et al., 1999; Crist
et al., 2001).
(b) Feature-based attention and task-related effects that are
sometimes regarded as attentional effects modulate the
activity of V4 neurons (Motter, 1994; Chelazzi et al., 2001;
Reynolds and Desimone, 2003; Li et al., 2004; Zhou and
Desimone, 2011; Gilbert and Li, 2013).
(c) Object-based attention canmodulate activity in areas as low
as V1 (Jolicoeur et al., 1986; Roelfsema et al., 1998; Scholte
et al., 1999; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Roelfsema et al.,
2000).
(d) TMS studies have shown task-specificmodulatory effects of
expectations in V4 neurons (Morishima et al., 2009).
These findings show that the activity of neurons in LVS
modulate with tasks, expectations and attention. The attentional
effects are endogenous that is, attentional effects that are not
induced by stimuli (exogenous attention). So the origin of these
25For discussions of the debate concerning the circuitry of contextual effects
(see Allman et al., 1985; Knierim and Van Essen, 1992; Lamme, 1995; Zipser
et al., 1996;Nothdurft et al., 2000;Hupe et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2001;Angelucci
et al., 2002; Cavanaugh et al., 2002; Levitt and Lund, 2002; Bair et al., 2003;
Angelucci and Bressloff, 2006).
26We will consider modifications of our working hypothesis that include
adding MT to the module at the end of this section.
effects lies in areas higher than LVS. Moreover, these effects
are content-sensitive. It is as though the neurons inside LVS
know what task a subject is performing or which aspect of the
stimulus the subject is attending to. This implies that LVS is not
informationally encapsulated.
We have described three sets of findings that challenge
the encapsulation of LVS. To summarize, (a) there are well-
established contextual effects on LVS and it is still a matter of
controversy whether these effects could all be explained in terms
of connections between neuronal assemblies within LVS, (b) there
are well-established effects of spatial attention, feature attention,
and object attention effects on LVS that originate from areas
outside LVS, and (c) there are well-established task related and
expectation related effects on LVS. We therefore think that LVS
is not informationally encapsulated and this puts pressure on the
encapsulation thesis.
It might be argued that attentional effects are not incompatible
with encapsulation. Later in the paper we will argue that this
response fails, but we shall discuss a more pressing question
first. Could the challenge for the encapsulation thesis be simply
removed by identifying the visual module with a neuroanatomical
area that is different from LVS? We think the answer is negative.
Let us elaborate.
One could modify the thesis that the visual module is identical
with LVS by either adding areas to it, subtracting areas from it,
or by a combination of these two strategies. We do not think
that any of these modifications would help the modularist. For
example, consider extending the alleged visual module by adding
area MT to LVS. This might seem to help the modularist because
under this modification the feedback connections from MT to
lower areas like V4 and V2 would now count as intra-modular
effects. But this move has an important cost. Now that area MT is
part of the visualmodule, those feedback connections fromhigher
areas that modulate the activities of MT neurons would threaten
the encapsulation thesis. There is ample evidence that there are
such feedback connections to MT (Treue and Maunsell, 1996;
Treue and Trujillo, 1999; Ninomiya et al., 2012). Now consider
the reverse strategy of shrinking the alleged module by, say,
subtracting area V4 from the LVS. The benefit of this would be
that modulating feedback connections to V4 would now count as
post-modular. But the cost is that the well-established effects of
V4 on lower areas that were originally classified as intra-modular
effects would now be incompatible with the encapsulation
thesis.
This problem seems to generalize to any proposal for expanding
or shrinking the alleged module by adding an area to, or
removing an area from, the upper boundary of LVS. Expanding
the boundaries of LVS to include areas higher in the visual
hierarchymight accommodate some of the aforementioned effects
as intra-modular. But this risks threatening the encapsulation
thesis because the higher an area in the visual hierarchy the
more it is likely that it receives input from areas further up.
This is due to the fact that the hierarchical organization of
the cortex gradually fades away as we move up the visual
hierarchy and gives way to a non-directional connectivity pattern.
Subtracting areas, on the other hand, suffers from the same
problem that we described above. It also risks conflicting with
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the requirement that the outputs of a module should be access
conscious.
For similar reasons, it is hard to see how the other ways of
expanding or shrinking the visual module, such as adding the
dorsal stream, adding areas prior to V1 or subtracting areas from
the lower boundary of the module, would help the modularist.
We therefore conclude that there is no clear neuroanatomical
strategy for demarcating an area in the visual system that
is encapsulated and whose outputs are access conscious
representations. There is no neuroanatomically identifiable visual
module.
The Temporal Strategy
Neuroanatomical strategies do not exhaust the options for the
modularists. One alternative is to partially characterize the neural
correlates of the visual module in a temporal fashion. The core
insight behind this strategy emerges from a deep and interesting
debate over the proper way to establish a mapping between the
functional and structural description of the brain. This debate
is independent from the debate over modularity, but it would
help to say a few words about it first. For a long time, a very
influential line of thought among neuroscientists has been that
there is a one to one mapping between the fine grained structure
of the cortex and its functional description, especially in areas
corresponding to the perceptual system. Accordingly, one could
say that some V1 neurons have the single function of responding
to changes in orientation in a specific area of the visual field. This
is what we earlier referred to as the tuning function of a neuron
or a neuronal assembly. This idea has been lately challenged by
neuroscientists who argue that neurons can perform different
functions at different times (see Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000, for
a review). A neuron’s tuning function and receptive field sizes
can both change as a result of receiving input through recurrent
feedback connections. For example, a V1 neuron that responds to
orientation in a small area of the visual field in the first 100 ms
following the presentation of the stimulus, shows sensitivity to
more global and complex features after 100 ms.
Lamme and Roelfsema (2000) expand on this idea by
distinguishing between two phases of activity in the early parts
of the visual cortex. The first phase, the feedforward sweep,
happens in the 40–100 ms window after stimulus onset. The
ensemble of neurons that participates in feed forward sweep
and their activation pattern is primarily determined by feed
forward connections. This is simply because there has not been
enough time for recurrent connections to exert their influence
on these neuronal assemblies. After 100 ms, horizontal and
feedback connections start modulating the activity of the neurons
that participated in feed forward sweep and change their tuning
functions and receptive fields.
This view, if correct, would have deep and important
implications for a wide variety of issues, including the nature of
attention and the neural correlates of consciousness. But for our
purposes here, the point is that the view provides an attractive
alternative for the modularist because it seems capable of dealing
with the complications that we raised in the “Neuroanatomical
Strategy” section. On this alternative, rather than identifying the
neural correlates of the visual module with a specific area of
the visual cortex, we identify it with a process that takes place
in a neuroanatomical area during a specific time interval. For
example, one option is to identify the visual module with the
feedforward sweep that takes place in LVS. This strategy seems
initially promising because it guarantees the encapsulation of the
visual module. Since during the feedforward sweep the activity
of LVS neurons is solely determine by feedforward connections,
and the neural correlate of the visual module is identified with the
feedforward sweep that happens in LVS, then the visual module is
encapsulated.
We can now see why some modularists, such as Raftopoulos
(2009, 2014), have found the temporal strategy attractive.
Raftopoulos does not identify the visual module with feedforward
sweep. Rather, drawing on Lamme (2003), he divides the wave
of activity after the feedforward sweep into two phases. The first
phase is a local recurrent phase that culminates at 120–150 ms
after stimulus onset. The second phase is a global recurrent
phase that starts around 150–200 ms after stimulus onset and
allows for feedback connections from higher cognitive areas. On
Raftopoulos’ view, the visual module (what he calls early vision)
should be identified with the processes that happen in the lower
areas of the visual hierarchy during the first 150 ms and include
the feedforward sweep and combine the feedforward sweep with
the local recurrent phase.
Despite its initial attraction, however, the temporal strategy
could not help themodularist save the encapsulation thesis. Recall
that our target is Access Encapsulation according to which there is
an informationally encapsulated component of the visual system
that gives rise to access conscious representations. But there is
ample evidence that the activity in the first 150 ms after stimulus
onset is not sufficient for access consciousness (Bridgeman, 1975,
1988; Kovács et al., 1995; Vogel et al., 1998; Rolls et al., 1999;
Dehaene et al., 2001; Lamme et al., 2002; Sergent and Dehaene,
2004; Koivisto et al., 2006, 2009; van Aalderen-Smeets et al.,
2006; Del Cul et al., 2007; Fahrenfort et al., 2007; Melloni et al.,
2007; Lamy et al., 2009; Railo and Koivisto, 2009). On the
dominant view, access consciousness requires the availability of
representations in a global workspace which does not happen
before 300 ms after stimulus onset (see Dehaene and Changeux,
2011, for a review of the relevant literature). What is controversial
is whether the earlier phase of activity is sufficient for phenomenal
consciousness, which is independent from issues regarding access
consciousness. The temporal strategy thus fails to save Access
Encapsulation for the simple reason that the activity during
the early phase after stimulus onset is not sufficient for access
consciousness.
Do Attentional Effects Entail Failure
of Encapsulation?
We have so far argued that given the status of recent
neuroscientific findings, it is very unlikely that a neural
correlate for a visual module that is informationally encapsulated,
and gives rise to access conscious representations, could be
identified. Our strategy has, in effect, presented the modularist
with a dilemma. The first horn is to identify the visual module
with a neuro-anatomically demarcated area of the visual cortex. If
the modularist chooses this option, she has to face the challenge
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of accounting for the existence of feedback connections that
modulate the activity of the neurons in early visual areas. The
second horn is to identify the visual module with processes that
are partially characterized temporally. But choosing this option
conflicts with the requirement that the visual module should give
rise to access conscious representations. Before ending the paper
we want to return to a question that we brought up earlier in the
“Neuroanatomical Strategy” section, namely, whether attentional
effects are compatible with encapsulation. We consider three
reasons for thinking that they are and argue that none of them
withstand scrutiny.
We noted, in the “Pre-Modular Challenge” section, that
proponents of modularity commonly hold that some attentional
effects on perception are mediated by changes in the input
to the module from earlier areas and are therefore compatible
with the encapsulation thesis. We agreed with the modularists
that pre-modular attentional effects do not count as failures of
encapsulation. But it might be argued that a similar strategy
could be employed against our arguments here. Accordingly,
one might argue that the attention-induced modulations of
the activities of the LVS neurons are mediated by effects on
the units earlier than LVS. Attention-induced modulations of
LVS neurons would therefore be mediated by modulations of
the inputs to LVS and can thus be explained away as pre-
modular.
Three problems threaten this response. First, the
aforementioned studies do not mention modulations of
pre-modular centers that accompany the attentional effects on
LVS. Second, there is reason to think that some of the attention
induced modulations in areas such as V4 and V2 could not have
mediated by effects on units prior to LVS. This is because some
earlier studies of attention induced modulations of areas V4, V2,
and V1 could not find any modulation of V1 neurons. In fact, it
was only very recently that modulations of V1 neurons have been
detected (Luck et al., 1997; Gandhi et al., 1999; Ito and Gilbert,
1999; Maunsell and Cook, 2002)27. Any impact of the units prior
to V1 on LVS has to be mediated by V1. Therefore the absence
of V1 modulation implies that the effects on higher areas, such
as V4 and V2, could not have originated from direct effects on
earlier units.
The third problem is that it is not clear how the pre-modular
strategy could be applied to modulations induced by cases of
feature and object attention. Attention induced boosting of the
signal corresponding to a specific feature or object requires
boosting the activity of a neuronal assembly that represents
that feature or object. But it is not clear how pre-modular
transducer and relay units could represent objects, or any
features except for those for which there are transducers. In fact,
within a broadly Fodorian framework that most modularists
endorse, representations of objects and representations of
most features are post-computational. Therefore, pre-modular
units, which are pre-computational, could not represent
features or objects. It is therefore unclear how attention
induced boosting of the activities of pre-modular units could
27Raftopoulos (2006) also points out that according to ERP findings, some
modulations due to spatial attention only affect V4 and not the previous areas.
account for the effects of object and feature attention on LVS
neurons.
Attentional effects have sometimes been regarded as
compatible with encapsulation because they constitute a
state of “readiness.”28. However, it is not clear why this should
render these effects compatible with encapsulation. It is true
that some attentional effects on visual areas happen before the
area receives stimulus-induced activities. Such effects would be
in some sense pre-perceptual, so “readiness” might be an apt
label here. However, it is not clear why the fact that an effect
happens prior to stimulus-induced activity makes it compatible
with encapsulation. If the higher areas of the cortex could “tell” a
V1 neuron that what it is about to “witness” on the left side of the
visual field is important and thereby affect the way it processes
the input, then the V1 neuron has access to the information in
the higher areas. It does not matter whether this access happens
prior or posterior to stimulus-induced activity.
A second thing that the “readiness” label might mean is
that these effects are not content-sensitive. Suppose there is a
perception-booster potion that boosts the readiness and thereby
the post-stimulus response of all the V1 neurons to all different
types of stimuli in their receptive fields. Then we agree that there
is a sense in which this boosting does not qualify as a failure of
encapsulation because explaining it does not require appealing
to contents. This is because explaining the effect of this potion
would not require attributing to the V1 neurons access to any sort
of content, e.g., what is the task at hand, what is salient for the
task, what should the perceiver attend to, etc. But all the attention
induced effects that we have cited here, whether they qualify as
cases of “readiness” or not, are content-sensitive effects.
These attentional effects cannot be explained away by saying
that they are mediated by pre-modular changes in input. Nor
does the fact that some of them happen before stimulus-induced
activity render them compatible with encapsulation, since they
are content-sensitive effects. We conclude that these attentional
effects are incompatible with encapsulation.
CONCLUSION
A core thesis in the debate between modularists and their
opponents is the encapsulation thesis according to which there
is a component of the visual system that is informationally
encapsulated from impact from areas higher in the perceptual
hierarchy. The secondary literature on the encapsulation thesis
has mainly focused on the implications of purely psychophysical
findings for this thesis. In this paper, we have pushed against
this common tendency in two ways. We have argued that due
to methodological limitations, purely psychophysical studies are
incapable of resolving the debate between the modularists and
their opponents. This gives us some reason to look for other
sources of evidence. We have also taken the first steps in this
direction by arguing that findings in the past few decades about
the neural structure and connectivity pattern of the visual system
undermines the encapsulation thesis.We hope that our arguments
28See Raftopoulos (2009, 2014). Raftopoulos sometimes refers to this as the
“rigging up” of the activities of these neurons.
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here help move the debate to the direction of taking the neural
data more seriously.
Throughout the discussion, we have also distinguished between
different versions of the encapsulation thesis and analyzed its
relation to the broader context of theoretical disputes surrounding
the modularity debate. These distinctions helped structure and
clarify the discussion that followed, and we hope that they will be
of service to the continuing debate on the topic.
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